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Abstract 
 
In this paper we argue that no forms of Turing test are either necessary or sufficient to 
establish if a machine is conscious or not. Furthermore, from a modeling point of view, the 
problem is that the Turing test does not really provide testable predictions. We believe that the 
model structure should explain the function (of consciousness). We argue that the cornerstone 
of any model on consciousness is to (partly) overcome the obstacle of the homunculus fallacy 
about the use of representations. In this contribution a possible solution is suggested, which 
makes use of reflexive architectures. The emerging computational constraints on the proposed 
architecture have lead to testable predictions on the dynamical behavior of the biological 
substrate. Interestingly, these predictions are in good agreement with recent experimental 
observations. 
 
 
*submitted to the Journal of Consciousness Studies (http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs.html) 
 Introduction 
Turing’s famous proposal (Turing, 1950) on a general criterion set for modeling cognition has 
begun a new chapter in discovering the nature of consciousness, the problem, which is as old 
as the philosophy itself. Turing’s work can be interpreted as an intention to bridge the gap 
between the philosophy of the mind and the so-called hardcore sciences (e.g., computational 
neuroscience, neurobiology, etc.). However, instead of facilitating and directing experimental 
research, the presumed generality of the Turing test gave rise to new and disturbing questions, 
many of which, from a modeling point of view, lead us into deadlocks. 
 
We admit that attacking the Turing test (e.g. Searle, 1980) and defending it (see e.g. Harnad 
2000a, 2000b, 2003) are both entertaining and useful in clarifying the logic behind the 
philosophy of intelligence and/or consciousness and/or thinking. We are afraid, however, that 
these routes cannot lead to testable model construction. This is why we feel inspired to chip 
on the conversation. We hope that our previous works on neurobiological modeling qualifies 
us for such contribution. Our contribution does not pretend to provide a direct solution to the 
problem of consciousness. Instead, our remarks are meant to be a call to extend the objectives 
of cognitive research.  
 
Problems of Turing tests 
In this paper we principally focus on Stevan Harnad’s thoughts from a pragmatic standpoint, 
because he addresses many exciting issues and aims to highlight their convergence. From our 
modeling perspective, he argues for the interrelatedness of the mind – body problem, the so-
called ‘other minds’ problem and the problem of symbol grounding. Summarizing Harnad’s 
argument (Harnad 2003, 2000b), we have found the following statements important for our 
reasoning: i, While the presence of consciousness in others (from human beings to artificial 
creatures to enter the club of conscious things) is an ontological question, having the 
knowledge about it is an epistemic problem that is (following Descartes) only our own belief 
(based on, e.g., the experience of others’ behavior) can help us in deciding on others’ club 
membership (i.e., epistemic inference on ontological problem). ii, The Turing test still 
remains the best device to support such an experience based decision. 
 
The weakness of the original form of the Turing test (T2) has been demonstrated by Searle's 
(1980) Chinese Room argument. As a partial solution, other levels of Turing tests have been 
introduced. For example, T4 corresponds to a system, which has indistinguishable internal 
functioning (even at the neuro-molecular level), while T5 is indistinguishable in “every 
empirically discernible respect” (Harnad, 2000b). The intermediate level of T3 scales up T2 to 
full performance capacity to pass the Total Turing Test (T3) (see, e.g., in Harnad, 2000a, b).  
 
In our view, both T3 and T4 (T5 is omitted for the sake of simplicity) have the same 
inescapable drawback: they are inherently anthropomorphic, only the mimicking capabilities 
are different. In other words, passing Turing test is not a sufficient condition for recognizing 
or defining consciousness. 
 
We claim that Turing tests are not necessary conditions either. An illuminating but somewhat 
controversial example is the case of patients awoken from coma, who can report conscious-
like sensations and mental processes during their coma state, which are not accessible for any 
Turing test. Young children before acquiring the ability of language would be another 
example, because they would also fail in a communication based Turing test. Thirdly, 
although there are famous demonstrations that some monkeys can use some hand signs based 
on American Sign Language and could pass certain items of T2-T4 Turing tests, neither of 
these tests can tell us, if lower level primates are conscious or not. To escape from this 
seemingly vicious circle of a neither necessary nor sufficient test, we suggest looking for 
other, possibly less anthropomorphic constraints on functional modeling with explanation 
power.    
 
As a first step, by rephrasing the problem with Harnad’s wording, we think that the issue at 
hand is how a “ghost in a machine” could convince itself about the presence or absence of “a 
ghost in another machine”.  
 
Our proposal is to find key modeling issues, which might lead to a functional explanation of 
the “ghost”. When functional models are investigated, one is forced to deal with internal 
functioning, which is inherently tied up with the use of representations. However, the concept 
of using representations is not without problems. The main attack against such representation 
has been clearly described by, e.g., Dennett (1991) and Searle (1992) in the form of the so-
called “homunculus” fallacy. According to the fallacy, the internal representation in any 
information processing system is meaningless without an interpreter.  The paradox claims that 
all levels of abstraction require at least one further level containing the corresponding 
interpreter. The interpretation – according to the fallacy – is just a new transformation and we 
are trapped in an endless recursion. An intriguing property of the fallacy is its generality: it is 
hard to think of a conscious being, which does not have any form of any interpreting function. 
Thus, the fallacy is not restricted to humans.  
 
It is our firm belief that any model targeting conscious mental processes, such as declarative 
memory, decision-making and planning (and feelings if you like), could be questioned by the 
arguments of the fallacy. That is, a constructive route to find the “ghost in the machine” is to 
resolve the fallacy first. Our thinking is best expressed by the words of Albert Szent-Györgyi 
(1951), the famous Hungarian Nobel Laureate: "There is no real difference between structure 
and function; they are the two sides of the same coin. If structure does not tell us anything 
about function, it means we have not looked at it correctly."  
 
A resolution of the fallacy 
First, we note that there can be more than one route to resolve the fallacy. For example, along 
the line of the classical black box modeling, the fallacy does not arise at all (see, e.g., Dennett 
(1991)). The price to pay is that black box modeling cannot provide structural explanation and 
must resort in the Turing tests. 
 
We claim that the paradox stems from vaguely described procedure of ‘making sense’. The 
fallacy arises by saying that the internal representation should make sense. To the best of our 
knowledge, this formulation of the fallacy has not yet been questioned except in our previous 
works (L  rincz, 1997, L  rincz et al. 2002a, b). The fallacy was turned upside down by 
changing the roles: Not the internal representation but the sensory input, e.g., retinal pattern, 
or its transformed forms, should make sense: The input makes sense if the same (or similar) 
inputs have been experienced beforehand and if the input can be derived or regenerated by 
means of the internal representation (L  rincz, 1997, L  rincz 1998, L  rincz et al., 2002a, b, c). 
According to this approach the internal representation interprets the input by (re-) 
constructing it.  
 The idea behind this approach is to execute the infinite recursion in a finite architecture. The 
change of the roles gives rise to a reconstructing loop structure. The loop has two 
constituents; the top and the bottom. The top part contains the internal representation that, in 
turn, generates the reconstructed input via the top-down transformation. The bottom part 
computes the difference between the actual input and the reconstructed input. This difference, 
the reconstruction error is then used to correct the internal representation via the bottom-up 
transformation, which generates (modifies) the reconstructed input and so on. This is a finite 
architecture with a converging, but – in principle – endless iteration and the fallacy is 
simplified to the problem of stability and convergence. It may be important to note that this 
route has nothing to do with mirroring (the external world). The input to the mirror and the 
mirror image differ in their material qualities and the mirror has no tool to compare the two 
and to engage in any iteration to make corrections. One might say that the internal 
representation, which reproduces the input, is a (spatio-temporal) model in a general sense: it 
predicts and reproduces (internal and external) sensory information (L  rincz et al., 2002a, b, 
c).  
 
There are relatively strong (mathematical and computational) constraints on how such a 
reconstruction network should work. These constraints severely restrict our freedom in 
building such architectures (L  rincz 2002b).  
 
A few corollaries of the resolution 
We followed the aforementioned constructive route and derived a model (L  rincz and 
Buzsáki, 2000, L  rincz et al., 2000a). The model has some emerging mathematical properties 
For example, successful reconstruction trivially requires at least two things:  
1. The information content of the input should be accessible for the internal 
representation 
2. The noise content of the input should not be reconstructed and, in turn, it should not be 
available for the internal representation 
The first request can be ensured by the maximization of information transfer of the bottom-up 
transformation – as it has long been suggested by Attneave (1954) and Barlow (1961). To 
achieve this, the bottom-up processing channels should be adjusted on the base of the arriving 
inputs. Loosely speaking, Point 2 says that (a) information and noise should be distinguished 
and (b) the bottom-up filtering should cancel the noise content. Distinction between 
information and noise is based on the degree of their compressibility. The concept of 
compressibility is related to the recognition of any organized structure in the input. If the 
given architecture is able to compile and interpret the input then it can also provide a more 
compact description. While a representation can be even more complex than the represented 
subject, it is tacitly assumed that a useful description method should yield compact 
representations in order to facilitate the recognition and understanding of higher level 
organization.  The noise component of the input has no structure or its structure is not 
recognizable at the given processing level in the hierarchical system. In contrast, information 
has structure and in turn, it can be compressed by highlighting the structure. 
 
What if a novel input arrives? Novel input, by definition, has two properties: (i) the input may 
have structure, (ii) the input and the embedded structure has not yet been encountered by the 
reconstruction architecture. The bottom-up transformation channels let through the 
experienced structural components and filter the non-experienced structural component of the 
input. The filtering results in slow reconstruction, which is in contrast to the case of familiar 
(learned) inputs, when reconstruction is fast. After adjusting the bottom-up transformation to 
enable the transmission of the structure in the novel input, reconstruction becomes faster.  
 
Reconstruction is perfect, if the bottom-up transformed input creates an internal 
representation, which is able to reconstruct the structural part of the input. This latter process 
requires the tuning of the top-down transformation, too. In the case of perfect reconstruction, 
bottom-up and top-down transformations invert each other and no error correction and  no 
iteration are needed. The system‘s functioning can be seen in a feed-forward manner, where 
top-down transformation simply reinforces the bottom-up one. We thus conclude that – in 
reconstruction networks – familiarity and novelty are tied to reconstruction speed. 
 
 
Neurobiological consequences 
The model was successfully mapped onto the hippocampus and the adjacent medial temporal 
lobe structures (L  rincz and Buzsáki, 2000, L  rincz et al., 2002a, b). This region is thought to 
be responsible for higher order memory (re)-organization. One implicit evidence is that lesion 
to this area may give rise to anterograde amnesia in which the ability of learning new things is 
impaired, whereas past memories are typically spared (Knowlton and Squire, 1994). The 
novelty of our mapping was that starting from a relatively small set of hypotheses many 
structural and functional features could be derived. These results may be considered as 
indirect predictions of the model. Without further assumptions, we could also show the 
emergence of some specific low order memory functions. One intriguing example is a 
functional explanation of a specific category learning disorder exhibited by patients of 
Alzheimer’s disease (Kéri et al., 2002). In our model, we could also demonstrate by means of 
simulations the inherent connection between repetition suppression observed in neural activity 
upon repeated presentation of external stimuli and priming (Szirtes and L  rincz, 2002, 
L  rincz et al., 2002b), which is a long-suspected relationship (Miller and Desimone, 1994). A 
few direct and falsifying predictions could also be made. These predictions have been 
reinforced recently: In accord with the model’s prediction on temporal properties, one specific 
feature (large and tunable temporal delaying capabilities) of a peculiar sub-region (the dentate 
gyrus) has been observed since then (Henze et al., 2002). Another prediction of the model 
concerns temporal integration (that is accumulation of information during a longer time 
interval) at the internal representation level. Temporal integration is exhibited, e.g., by the 
maintenance of spiking after the excitation stops. This property has been found recently in the 
deep layers of the entorhinal cortex (Egorov, et al., 2002)., which is exactly the container of 
internal representation suggested by our model. This property can be contrasted to other 
layers (e.g., the superficial layer of the entorhinal cortex) where activity self-terminates, as it 
was demonstrated by the same work. 
 
All these are preliminary results requiring further investigations. We are also aware that 
resolving the fallacy will not explain consciousness. On top of that, it is possible that this 
single issue may not even be on the right track in understanding the nature of consciousness. 
And yet, the method to follow structural considerations while dropping anthropomorphic 
features has already lead to testable predictions.  
 
Summarizing our view, instead of being trapped by the Turing test we suggest seeking other 
methods for investigating consciousness. We think that armed with the Turing test alone, 
makes us too heavy to move on for two fundamental reasons:  
1. The Turing test is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish if “there is a ghost in the 
machine”.  
2. The Turing test is not capable to provide testable predictions about beings with or 
without consciousness. It is challenging to think of better alternatives. 
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